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TORTs-DAMAGEs-"Wrongful Life"-The Supreme Court of New Jersey
holds that negligent failure to advise of possible birth defects causing
parents to forego option of abortion is not actionable by child or parents.
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
Patient, her husband, and their child, who was born with birth defects
because the mother had contracted German measles during the first trimester of her pregnancy, brought this malpractice action against the
defendant physicians, alleging negligence in failing to inform the patient
of the possibility that the child, because of the German measles infection
(hereinafter rubella), could be born with defects. The patient claimed
that this failure to inform her of the possibility of birth defects caused
her to forego the option of procuring an abortion. The child was born
with speech, hearing and vision defects.
The complaint was divided into three counts, setting forth the complaints of the child, the mother, and the father respectively. The child
sought damages for his defective condition; the mother sought damages
for emotional injury caused by the child's condition; and the father
sought damages for the expense of caring for the defective child.
The trial court dismissed the complaint of the child at the close of the
case of the patient, the husband, and the child because there was no evidence showing that the defendants' act had caused the injuries of which
the infant complained. The complaint of the patient and her husband was
dismissed after all the evidence had been presented because the trial court
believed that the type of abortion in question would have been a crime
under the law of New Jersey.1 Patient, her husband, and the child appealed to the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, which court,
before the case was argued before them, certified the appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The supreme court affirmed the lower court's
ruling dismissing the child's cause of action, holding that, even if the
defendants' act was the proximate cause of the child's injuries, he had
suffered no damages cognizable at law. A divided court held that the
patient and her husband, respectively, could not recover on the grounds
that they had suffered no damages cognizable at law and, even if they
had, the policy of the law recognizing the preciousness of human life and
favoring its preservation would preclude recovery.2
1. The trial court based its determination on N.J. STAT. ANN. fit. 2A, § 87-1:
Any person who, maliciously or without lawful justification, with the intent to
cause or procure the miscarriage of a pregnant woman, administers or prescribes
or advises or directs her to take or swallow any poison, drug, medicine or noxious
thing or use any instrument or means whatever, is guilty of a high misdemeanor.

2. The report states that the court voted as follows:
For affirmance: Justices Francis, Proctor, Hall and Haneman. For reversal in part:

Chief Justice Weintraub. For reversal: Justices Jacobs and Schettino.
Although Justices Jacobs and Schettino voted for reversal, their dissenting
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Since the plaintiffs' case had been dismissed below, on appeal the supreme court considered all plaintiffs' testimony as true. The court thus
assumed that the defendants had "affirmatively misled" the mother by
reassuring her that there would be no danger of birth defects resulting
from the mother's rubella infection. The court also assumed that the
mother could have obtained a legal abortion somewhere.
The court first considered the child's cause of action. It was noted that
the right of an infant to sue for pre-natal torts was recognized in Smith
v. Brennan.' That case held that an infant may recover for any injury
which resulted from a "disruption" of the normal processes of pre-natal
development. Indispensable to the cause of action under Smith is an act
which causes a defect in what, but for the act of defendant, would otherwise have been a normal child. Applied to the facts of the present case,
the Smith holding is a bar to the infant-plaintiff. Since the child had already incurred maximum damage from the rubella virus before the defendant's entry into the case there could be no recovery. This being so,
the court concluded that the infant was seeking damages because the
defendants' act indirectly caused him to live, albeit with defects. The
infant was claiming, in effect, that he should have been allowed to be
killed by an abortion, and sought damages for being allowed to live.'
The court concluded that the dismissal of the child's case must be
affirmed because there is no way known to the law whereby his damages
may be ascertained. The normal method of computing damages necessarily involves a worsened condition in the plaintiff, subsequent to-and
resulting from-the defendants' act. As stated by McCormick: "In a case
opinion does not seriously discuss the child's cause of action. It discusses in depth
only the cause of action of the mother and the husband, see n.21 infra.
3. 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
4. For a detailed treatment of the problems raised by this type of fact situation, see
Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for Wrongful Life, 1 Israel L. Rev. 513 (1966).
This article considers the two previous American cases dealing with the problem of
"wrongful life": (1) Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849: cert. denied,
379 U.S. 945 (1963), where a plaintiff infant sued natural father because plaintiff was born
illegitimate; complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, aff'd on other
grounds-public policy; and (2) Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 223
N.E.2d 343 (1966), where plaintiff infant sued state of New York, alleging that negligence
by state employees had allowed her mother, an inmate of a state mental institution, to be
raped, with the result that plaintiff was born illegitimate-the trial court, Williams v.
State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965), had allowed the plaintiff's cause of action
but was reversed on appeal because the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, and the Court
of Appeals, would not countenance a new cause of action and because damages were not
ascertainable.
A recent case, Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. of App. 1967), on similar
facts, affirmed the dismissal of an infant plaintiff's complaint without serious discussion of
the nature of the complaint. See also, Custodio v. Bauer, - Cal. App. -, 59 Cal. Rptr.
463 (1967).
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of tort... the general purpose of compensation is to give a sum of money
to the person wronged which ... will restore him to the position he would
be in if the wrong had not been committed." 5 (Emphasis added.)
This method does not work in the instant case because the subsequent condition of the infant-plaintiff, which logically should be a
worsened condition, is life. As the court put it, "[t]his Court cannot
weigh the value of life with impairments against the non-existence of life
itself." 6
In affirming the dismissal of the parents' case, the court rested its
decision on two grounds: (1) the impossibility of computing damages,
and (2) the public policy favoring human life.
Even though the parents sought damages for emotional injury and for
the expense of raising a defective child their problem of showing a basis
for computing damages is precisely the same as that of the infant. The
court reasoned that if the parents claim that they are injured by the fact
or condition of being parents, i.e., by the birth of their child, then the
state or condition of not being parents must necessarily be the prior condition from which their damages must be computed. To find that the
parents had suffered a compensable injury would require a positive evaluation of a negative condition; for the parents claim, in effect, that the
better condition would have obtained if their son had never been born.'
The supreme court administered the coup de grace to the parents' cause
of action by stating that even if the type of abortion in question were
legal and even if every item of the complaint were true as alleged, the
claim "would still be precluded by the countervailing public policy supporting the preciousness of human life." 8 The court decided that its view
of the case did not require a determination of whether the type of abortion in question would be legal.
There was, in the report of this decision, a separate concurring opinion
by Justice Francis which stated that the majority should have rested its
decision on the ground that, since the type of abortion in question would
have been illegal, the defendants were under no duty to advise the mother
that she might obtain such an abortion. A dissenting opinion by Justice
Jacobs argued that the legislature, by using the words "without lawful
justification" in the abortion statute, 9 was deliberately leaving the inter5. C. McCoaecx, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 260-61 (1935).
6. 227 A.2d at 692.
7. Id. at 693 the court stated: "In order to determine their compensatory damages, a
court would have to evaluate the denial to them of the intangible, unmeasurable and complex human benefits of motherhood and fatherhood and weigh these against the alleged
money and emotional injuries. Such a proposed weighing is similar to that which we have
found impossible to be performed for the infant plaintiff." (Emphasis added.)
8. Id. at 693.
9. See n.1, supra.
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pretation of these words to the courts and that the court should have
interpreted them so as to include within their meaning both therapeutic
and eugenic abortion.' The dissent also argued that since the abortion in
question would, in its opinion, have been legal, the court should have
found that the denial of the option to choose an abortion gave rise to
measurable damages. Specifically, while the dissent conceded that the
emotional damages might be difficult to ascertain, it argued that the
proximate results of the defendants' wrongful act were readily ascertainable, i.e., "measurable medical and maintenance expenses.""
Chief Justice Weintraub, in an opinion dissenting in part, agreed that
the denial to the mother of the option to abort was a compensable injury.
However, he disagreed with the view that damages for such a wrong
should include the expenses of the parents in caring for the child. He
noted the anomaly involved in arguing that a defendant, who is not liable
for damage done to the child, should be liable to some third party for
their expenses incurred with respect to that very damage.' Chief Justice
Weintraub merely stated that the denial of the option to abort should be
submitted to the trier of fact for evaluation. It must be noted, though,
that the logic of permitting such a claim to the mother gives no support to
the infant's "wrongful life" claim.
The mother's claim, if it were allowed, would be one which pertained
strictly to her, not to the child. She would be seeking damages for the
10. An eugenic abortion is one designed to prevent a child from being born because
there is a "prognosis that the child will be born with a grave physical or mental defect." A
therapeutic abortion is one designed to protect the life, and in some cases, the health, of the
mother, Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DuQuTEsNE L. REv. 125, 125-26 (1966).
For a representative statute authorizing therapeutic abortion, see the California Therapeutic Abortion Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (West's Calif. Legislative
Service-1967, p. 633) which authorizes abortion, in cases approved by a medical staff,
where "t]here is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair
the physical or mental health of the mother."
For a statute authorizing eugenic abortion, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Cumulative
Supp. 1967):
When abortion not unlawful . . . it shall not be unlawful to advise, procure
or cause the miscarriage of a pregnant woman or an abortion when the same is performed by a doctor of medicine ... if he can reasonably establish that:
There is substantial risk that the child would be born with grave physical or
mental defect ....
At the present time, the only "lawful justification" for abortion in New Jersey is the protection of the life of the mother. See, State v. Bradenburg, 137 N.J.L. 124, 58 A.2d 709 (1948),
where the Supreme Court did not find it necessary to consider whether "threatened impairment of a woman's health, as distinguished from the saving of her life, constitutes lawful
justification."
11. 227 A.2d at 704.
12. Weintraub agreed with the majority concerning the child's cause of action. As to
the dissenting opinion on this point, see n.21 infra.
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denial of the option to choose and not for any result of that denial, such
as the life of the child. 3 Strictly speaking, the option to choose an abortion is not to be considered in the same light as the actual choosing, or
obtaining, of that abortion. But if the action for the denial of the option
were allowed one would have to find that the option had some value in
and of itself, without reference to the object to be attained by the exercise
of that option. It is submitted that the quesion here should be whether the
option can have a positive value apart from its arguably illegal object. 4
By arguing that the denial of the option to abort should be a compensable injury Chief Justice Weintraub and Justice Jacobs indicated
that they believed the abortion in question would not be illegal. But in
fact, a eugenic abortion, according to the latest New Jersey decision on
the subject, is not one that would be lawfully justified.'5 To find, in the
instant case, that the denial of the option to abort was a compensable
injury, the court would first have to find, without even considering the
policy rationale actually advanced by the majority, that eugenic abortion
is included within the meaning of the term "lawful justification."
State v. Bradenburg,6 the most recent case construing the abortion
statute, refused to consider whether protection of the mother's health
was included within the term "lawful justification." The dissenters in
Gleitman would have included, within the statutory justification, the mere
prospective defect in an unborn child. It seems that if the court in
Brandenburg expressly refused to consider whether protection of the
mother's health would be lawful justification for abortion, they could
scarcely have meant to include within that term the mere condition of the
fetus.'

7

13. But cf. Custodio v. Bauer, - Cal. App. -, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). In that case
the husband and wife sued physicians because they had negligently performed a sterilization operation so that a child was conceived. The action was brought before birth. The
parents appealed from a dismissal of their complaint. On appeal the Court of Appeal for the
First District held: that, if physicians negligently performed a sterilization operation, even
if the woman would not suffer physical injury as a result of the pregnancy, the woman and
her husband, who already had nine children, would be entitled to more than nominal
damages.
14. In digesting this concept, the reader might consider the fact that courts will not lend
their aid to enforce illegal bargains. The same concept might apply to plaintiffs in a tort
case, where the claim is made that X wrongfully deprived Y of an opportunity to commit
a wrongful act, or to submit to a criminal act. See generally, 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS,
§§ 1373-78 (1951), with special reference to § 1375.
15. State v. Brandenburg, 137 N.J.L. 124, 58 A.2d 709 (1948).
16. Id.
17. Ryan, Human Abortion Laws and the Health Needs of Society, 17 W. REs. L. REv.
424 (1965), at 428, where the author states that "deformity cannot be predicated in a given
case" where the mother is infected with rubella. In discussing rubella infection Ryan points
out that there is only a probability of defect in the fetus, i.e., in the first few weeks, 60%
chance of birth defect; in the first trimester, 20% chance of birth defect; at or after 12 weeks,
less than 10% chance of birth defect.
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In light of earlier New Jersey decisions'" which interpreted the language of a statute forbidding certain sales "without just cause," the court,
in the instant case, might possibly have construed the abortion statute
in such a way as to recognize protection of the mother's health as lawful
justification for abortion. But inclusion of this as justification would raise
the possibility that eugenic abortion would be deemed legal, sub silentio,
if it were recognized that the prospective status of the fetus was a determinant of the emotional or mental health of the mother. 9 If the
possible defective status of the fetus were a determinant of the health of
the mother, and if the protection of the mother's health, i.e., emotional
or mental health, were included within the meaning of the term "lawful
justification," then a court which allowed abortion to protect the health
of the mother in effect would be legalizing eugenic abortion. Even if never
expressly considered, eugenic abortion would at least be put beyond the
proscribed limits of the criminal statute.
Considered merely as a legal and not as a moral issue, can such a great
departure from the case law construing the statute 20 be taken without
submitting the question to the legislature? The dissenters suggest that the
statute should be so construed, with the right of rebuttal in the legislature. But, in such a controverted area of the criminal law, it is submitted
that the legislature should be accorded the duty, not merely the right, of
proclaiming what the law shall be.
It is worthy of note that none of the contending viewpoints represented
18. Sanitary Vendors Inc. v. Byrne, 40 N.J. 157, 190 A.2d 876 (1963), and other cases
cited at 705-06 of 227 A.2d. Sanitary Vendors was concerned with the issue of whether the
sale of contraceptives was "without just cause." The statute construed was N.J. STAT. ANN.
tit. 2A, § 170-76:
Any person who, without just cause, utters or exposes to the view of another,
or possesses with intent to utter or expose to the view of another, or to sell the
same, any instrument, medicine or other thing, designed or purporting to be designed for the prevention of conception or the procuring of abortion, or who in any
way advertises or aids in advertising the same, or in any manner, whether by
recommendation for or against its use or otherwise, gives, or causes to be given, or
aids in giving any information how or where any such instrument, medicine or other
thing may be had, seen, bought or sold, is a disorderly person.
19. Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices, 17 W. RES. L. Rlv. 403 (1965). At 411,
after stating that, as of the date of the article, no state law permitted abortion because of
an "expected abnormality" of the fetus, the author points out how laws forbidding such
abortions may be circumvented:
A psychiatric opinion may be sought, and this specialist may suggest that the
patient's mental condition, influenced by the fear of fetal malformation from the
rubella, may become suicidal if the pregnancy is not interrupted. Her life is thus
endangered.
The reader should here refer to the California Therapeutic Abortion Act, supra, n.10. It
may be seen from the wording of the statute there set forth that it would be within the
province of the medical staff to authorize an eugenic abortion where, in their opinion, the
possibly defective fetus constituted a threat to the mother's mental health.
20. State v. Brandenburg, 137 N.J.L. 124, 58 A.2d 709 (1948).
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in the instant decision seriously takes the view that the infant-plaintiff
should have been permitted his cause of action." On this point the reasoning of the Gleitman court, certainly of the majority opinion and the
opinion dissenting in part, is in accord with the current state of American
legal opinion. 2 But this is not to say that courts, in similar situations,
have not recognized that a tort may be inflicted on such an infantplaintiff.3 The instant case is not in point with the other "wrongful life"
cases because the infant-plaintiff complained of injuries that had been
inflicted after his conception but before birth. Usually the "wrongful life"
plaintiff complains of injuries that have been inflicted simultaneously with
conception.
This aspect of the problem has proved to be the insurmountable obstacle in the "wrongful life" area. As so aptly stated by Tedeschi: "The
characteristics feature of the question with which we are dealing . . . is

that the act of A, which B claims injured him, is the very act but for
which B could not exist." 4 Although not strictly applicable to the facts
of the instant case, the thought expressed is the logical barrier that has
forced the courts that have considered the problem to refuse to hear a
plaintiff who seemingly complains of life. It does not appear that the
courts will consider allowing recovery in cases such as Gleitman without
legislative action. If a wrong is actually done to a person in the position
of the "wrongful life" plaintiff, it would seem that, until such action is
taken, it must be one without a remedy.
Robert C. Hillen
21. Even though Justice Jacobs, joined by Justice Schettino, voted for complete reversal in the instant case, their dissent does not seriously consider the nature of the child's
complaint or the reasons for their saying, ostensibly, that it should be allowed. The dissent
merely stated:
while logical objection may be advanced to the child's standing and injury,
logic is not the determinative factor and should not be permitted to obscure that
he has to bear the frightful weight of abnormality throughout his life . . . . 227
A.2d at 704.
It is the opinion of this writer that the views of the dissenting justices regarding abortion
were so pronounced that they simply decided to vote for reversal of the case as a whole.
This opinion is reinforced by noting that, except for the quoted passage, the dissent does
not at any point come to grips with the odd nature of the "wrongful life" problem, see n.4,
supra, and the text accompanying n.24, infra.
22. N.4, supra.
23. The court in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 945 (1963), discussing illegitimacy as a basis for a tort action, stated: "Children
born illegitimate have suffered an injury. If legitimation does not take place, the injury is
continuous. If legitimation cannot take place, the injury is irreparable." 190 N.E.2d at 857.
The same recognition of the tortious nature of the injuries inflicted on the illegitimate
infant-plaintiff pervades the trial court opinion in Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 276
N.Y.S.2d 885, 223 N.E.2d 343 (1966), where the court overruled defendant's motion for
dismissal. But see, Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. of App. 1967), where
the court merely speaks of an alleged tort.
24. Tedeschi, n.4, supra, at 528.

